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Search engines commonly use “sponsored links”, where certain advertisers’ links are pro-
moted to be placed above others in return for monetary payment. It is natural to assume
that all providers value a higher ranked placement more than lower ranked ones. Then
how should the seller optimally sell these ranked slots is critical for the search engines. In
this paper we study the seller’s (search engine) optimal selling mechanism in the following
setting: buyers (advertisers), each of whom has unit demand, compete for positions oﬀered
by the seller. While each buyer’s valuation for each position is private and independent,
the ranking for these positions is common among all the buyers. However the rate at which
these valuations change might be diﬀerent. We begin with 4 simpliﬁed scenarios specifying
how buyers valuations change for diﬀerent positions, namely,“parallel”, “convergent”, “di-
vergent”, and “convergent then divergent”. We ﬁnd that the optimal incentive compatible
allocation mechanism is quite diﬀerent in determining the “pivot” types and the order to
ﬁll in the positions. Under some conditions, these mechanisms are even eﬃcient in terms of
maximizing the total welfare of the auctioneer and bidders. When the buyers’ valuations
for lower positions decrease at diﬀerent rates, the seller earns more than the case of simple
second-price sequential auction.
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1 Introduction
The rise of “e-business” over the last few years has led to a revival of interest in well-known
economic and strategic problems, such as the design of on line auctions [19], price dispersion
of homogenous goods, [6], online reputation [5], just to give a few examples. Arguably, it
has also generated some qualitatively new problems to which the methods of economic theory
could be brought to bear. This paper addresses one new phenomenon arising in question
with the widespread popularity of search engines such as Google.com. More speciﬁcally, this
is one arising from the presence of ”sponsored links” on the output of a key-word search
through internet search engines. In contrast to the results generated through the search engine’s
retrieving algorithm, these links are explicitly sold to ﬁrms that have an interest in advertising
their products to the search engine users. The total paid placement market is now worth
some $2 billion a year (2003), and is widely credited for the revitalization of the search engine
business 1.
In allocating the paid slots to advertisers, the order of these links matters – because a
higher placement on a search page leads to higher traﬃc, and eventually an increased ﬁnancial
payoﬀ [8, 7]. Therefore the earlier link is more valuable than its successors. However, it is
not clear how much more valuable it is and the diﬀerence of valuations could quite evidently
depend on the identities of the advertisers concerned. For example, Walmart might not see
much diﬀerence between obtaining the ﬁrst slot and the second; however a small ﬁrm seeking
to use these links to catch the consumer’s eye might ﬁnd much more value in a higher link than
in a lower one, even though it values each link less than Walmart might do. This gives rise to
a mechanism design problem from the point of view of the seller, where buyers only need one
object, they value objects diﬀerently, their rankings of valuations are common, but the rates
1http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story id=1932434
1at which these valuations change may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent buyers.
In practice, most of the search engines use auctions to sell these paid slots[10]. For example,
Overture sells their paid positions mainly through real time pay-your-bid auctions. Goto.com
even showed the current winning prices next to the paid links, like an open auction. Google uses
some variant of a second-price auction through their so called “AdWord Program”. However,
no theoretical research has been done to show the optimal mechanism of selling these ranked
objects. Will a sequential auction that sells one position a time be better than a simultaneous
auction? Should the highest position be auctioned oﬀ earlier than a lower position? Is the
highest rejected bid auction optimal? Should the auctioneer leave some positions unﬁlled?
This paper seeks to design an optimal selling mechanism from the perspective of the seller
(search engine).
This kind of allocation can also be applied to other contexts. An example could be a
scheduling problem where several tasks are waiting in a line for processing, each with a certain
approaching deadline, and tasks bid for the position in the waiting queue. Or the selling of
a set of condos where buyers’ preferences towards the locations of these condos are roughly
ranked in the same way.
The problem of allocating multiple objects to individuals who have diﬀerent preferences
for the objects has been studied in the matching literature (Roth and Sotomayor (90))[20].
However, the problem we consider here is diﬀerent in that we focus our attention on Bayesian
mechanism design.
The closest literature related to this paper is optimal (multiple unit) auction design. We
follow very closely Myerson(81) [15], where he studied the optimal mechanism to sell a single
object, and found that it is optimal to sell the object to the bidder with the highest valuation,
given his virtual value 2 is non-negative. As a generalization, Maskin and Riley (1990) [13]
studied the optimal auction of selling multiple identical objects, using a similar approach. For
optimal auctions with heterogeneous objects, many papers consider multi-unit demand. Then
2In Myerson (81), the virtual value is deﬁned as ti −
1−F(ti)
f(ti)
2the question of demand reduction arises [3]; when the objects are complements or substitutes,
or when the number of buyers is small or large, whether or not to sell the items separately or
in bundles, [17], [4], [2]. Menezes (1998) [14] studied a pooled auction in the environment of
identical or perfectly correlated objects where every bidder submits a single bid, and bidders
with higher bids are given the rights to choose their ideal objects earlier. The environment
in [14] is similar to one of the four distinct cases we study in this paper. For eﬃciency in
multi-unit auctions, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) [9] and Perry and Reny (1999) [18] show
that when bidders’ values are interdependent, the Vickrey mechanism can be generalized to
achieve eﬃciency, as long as each bidder’s signal is one dimensional. Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2001) [12] shows that when bidders have multi-dimensional signals, eﬃciency is usually not
obtained.
The problem we address in this paper is diﬀerent from the above two streams. We con-
sider the optimal allocation of non-identical objects, where buyers’ values for these objects
are ranked in the same order, and each buyer only needs one object (unit demand). Buyers
have independent private values. We categorize the environment into four cases based on how
bidders’ valuation drops with the rank of the positions, relative to other bidders, namely, “par-
allel”, “convergent”, “divergent”, and “convergent then divergent”. In each case, the optimal
allocation rule and payment scheme is characterized. We ﬁnd that the optimal allocation is
quite diﬀerent under these diﬀerent cases. Thus understanding the buyers’ preference charac-
teristics is vital in determining the optimal mechanism. More speciﬁcally, as long as the buyers’
valuations for lower positions decrease at diﬀerent rates, the seller can extract more buyers sur-
plus than the standard second-price auction can, because the optimal expected payment in our
mechanism is at least as high as the next highest buyer’s valuation for that particular position;
under some conditions these optimal allocation rules maximize the total welfare of the seller
and the buyers, thus they are also socially eﬃcient. We also ﬁnd that this optimal mechanism
cannot usually be implemented by simple sequential “highest rejected bid” auctions.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and notation. We
3then discuss the optimal mechanism under four diﬀerent speciﬁcations of buyers preferences in
Section 3. Some issues related to the implementation of the optimal mechanism are discussed
in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
Assume that a set of risk neutral buyers N = {1,2,...n} compete for K < N positions. Buyers
have independent private types. Buyer i0s type ti is distributed over the interval Ti = [a,b]
(a ≥ 0) according to the distribution function Fi with associated density function fi. Let
T = ×n
j=1Tj denote the product of the set of buyers’ types, and for all i, let T−i = ×j6=iTj.
Deﬁne f(t) to be the joint density of t = (t1,t2,...,tn). Similarly, deﬁne f−i(t−i) to be the
joint density of t−i = (t1,...,ti−1,ti+1,...,tn). Since the types are independent, f(t) = f1(x1)×
f2(x2) × ... × fn(xn), and f−i(t−i) = f1(x1) × ... × fi−1(xi−1) × fi+1(xi+1) × ... × fn(xn).
Let vk
i (ti) represent buyer i’s valuation for the k’th position, which is non-increasing in k.
For simplicity we write vk
i (ti) and vk
i interchangeably. Let t0 represent the seller’s type, so
his valuation for position k is given by vk
0. Assume that all buyers’ valuation functions are
either parallel, or there exists a position µ ∈ (−∞,∞) for which all the bidders have the same
valuation and this is common knowledge. Assume for a certain position, we can separate the
expression of the diﬀerence between types from the expression of the diﬀerence between any
two values. More speciﬁcally, assume vk
i (ti)−vk
j(tj) = (ti−tj)S(k), i,j = 0,1,...n, where S(k)
is independent of t. For simplicity, in this paper we assume buyers’ valuations are linear in the
rankings.
By the “Revelation Principle” ([1], [11], [16]), without loss of generality, we restrict our
attention to direct mechanisms. Let P : T → 4 represent the allocation rule, where 4 is the
set of positions, and X : T → RN represent the payment rule. Our goal is to identify the
optimal mechanism (P,X) which is incentive compatible and individually rational. Following
Myerson, let pi(t) represent the probability for buyer i to win one position and xi(t) be the
buyer i’s expected payment for his winning position. More speciﬁcally, let pk
i (t) represent the
4probability that buyer i wins the kth position, xk
i (t) be buyer i’s expected payment for the kth
position. Then we have pi(t) =
P
K pk


















































i (t) ≤ 1 ∀i, ∀t ∈ T (5)
For the buyers, the “Individual Rationality” condition ensures that by not participating, a
buyer can guarantee himself a payment of zero:
Ui(p,x,ti) ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀ti (6)
The “Incentive Compatibility” condition ensures that every buyer reports his true type.
This is written as:








i (t−i,si) − xk
i (t−i,si)
i
f−i(t−i)dt−i ∀i, ∀ti, ∀si 6= ti
(7)
Thus our goal is to identify the optimal pk
i (t) and xk
i (t) to maximize the expected payoﬀ
of the seller. That is,
max( 2)







5Proposition 1 When S(k) ≥ 0, an allocation mechanism is feasible if and only if:
if si ≤ ti, then Q(p,si) ≤ Q(p,ti) (8)




Ui(p,x,a) ≥ 0 (10)
(3), (4), and (5)
Please refer to appendix A.1 for proof. When S(k) < 0, everything follows through except (9)
now becomes:





Ui(p,x,b) ≥ 0 (12)
.
We will discuss this further in section 3.3.























































































































a (1 − Fi(si))Qi(p,si)dsi












































































i (ti,t−i)f(t)dt − N · Ui(p,x,a) (15)
such that
Ui(p,x,a) ≥ 0
Qi(p,x,si) ≤ Qi(p,x,ti), if si ≤ ti
pk








i (t) ≤ 1 ∀i, ∀t ∈ T
Since buyers’ valuations drop for a lower ranked position, based on how their valuations drop
relative to other’s (they may drop in the same rate, or some may drop faster/slower than the
others), we categorize the situations into four cases, namely, parallel, convergent, divergent,
7and convergent then divergent. We are going to discuss the optimal mechanism for these
diﬀerent cases in Section 2. Figure 1 shows these 4 cases, where µ represents the position for
which each buyer has the same valuation.
1 2 3 k
i v
(a) parallel








1 2 3 k
i v
µ
(d) convergent and divergent
Figure 1: Diﬀerent cases of buyers preferences with respect to the ranking of the positions
3 Four Diﬀerent Cases
3.1 The Parallel Case
First consider the case where every buyer’s valuation for a lower position drops at the same
rate. In the example of search engine advertising (paid placement), if the competing advertisers
have relatively the same taste or budget, the change of their valuation for positions may be
relatively stable, thus we may approximate their valuation function by assuming that their
8valuations drop at the same rate. Let vk
i (ti) = ti − αk, where α > 0 is a constant. Thus
the type of the buyers are characterized by the intersections of their utility functions with the
value axis (vertical axis in the ﬁgure). From now on assume that the seller’s valuations for all
the items are 0. Then vk
i (ti) − vk


















f(t)dt − N · Ui(p,x,a) (16)
This is very similar to Myerson(1981)’s optimal auction design problem. Notice that in the
objective function, the expression of ti and k can be separated. Deﬁne c(ti) as the modiﬁed
virtual value, which is represented by the ti term in the objective function (in this case,
c(ti) = ti−
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) . If the regularity condition is satisﬁed that ti−
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) is strictly increasing
in ti, and if we can impose that Ui(p,x,a) = 0, then Eq.(16) is maximized when the objects
are assigned to the K buyers with the highest types (ti), given that their virtual values are
higher than αK. More importantly, as long as the winners are determined, it doesn’t matter
which buyer gets which object. This is because in the objective function, the part containing
ti and the part containing k can be fully separated. Thus the total contribution of the winning
types to the objective function remains the same no matter which position k they are assigned.
Notice the reserve price is a constant for each position according to this allocation rule (r(k) =
solves{c(ti)−αK = 0}). That is to say, as long as a buyer is eligible to win the last position(i.e.,
if the buyer has the K’th highest non-negative virtual value), he is eligible to win every other
position.
To formally state the allocation rule, let Cj(t−i) as the j0th highest virtual value among all
the buyers except i. Then deﬁne
zk(t−i) = inf{si|c(si) − αK ≥ 0 and c(si) ≥ Ck(t−i), k = 1,2,...,K} (17)
Proposition 2 In the parallel case, the optimal incentive compatible allocation rule is to al-
locate one position to each of the K bidders with the highest modiﬁed virtual values, given that
their types (tis) satisfy that c(ti)−αK ≥ 0. The allocation of the positions among the winners





1 if si ≥ zK(t−i)
0 if si < zK(t−i)
(18)
Please refer to Appendix A.2 for proof.










i (ti,t−i) − xk
i (ti,t−i)
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i (t) − S(k)(ti − zK(t−i))
(19)





K is deﬁned as
the K0th highest type (other than i) buyer’s valuation for the k0th position, or buyer zK(t−i)0s
valuation for position k. This means, it doesn’t matter for a winning buyer which position he
is allocated, as long as he is paying the K + 1’s buyer’s valuation for that particular position.
His utility is the same because of the parallel characteristics of the value functions.
This mechanism can be implemented as a “pseudo-second-price auction”, where every bid-
der bids their type, and the highest K bidders win. The higher their types, the higher the
positions they are allocated. And each one pays the highest rejected bidder’s valuation for his
winning position. To better understand this mechanism, assume that buyers types follow a
uniform distribution between [0,1]. Then the reserve price for each position is the same, that
is, 1+αK
2 . If there are 3 positions for sale and α is 0.05, the reserve price is 0.575 for each
position . If the realized types are t1 = 0.9, t2 = 0.8, t3 = 0.75, t4 = 0.7, then the positions
1, 2, 3 will be allocated to buyer 1, 2, 3, respectively, with the expected payment for those
position v1(0.7), v2(0.7), v3(0.7), which are, 0.65, 0.6, 0.55. On the other hand, if the realized
types are: t1 = 0.9, t2 = 0.7, t3 = 0.5, t4 = 0.2. Then t1 is allocated to position 1, t2 is
allocated to position 2, while position 3 is not allocated.
103.2 The Convergent Case
This describes the case that the higher type buyer’s valuation drops faster, while still remain
higher, than a lower type buyer’s valuation for a lower position. In other words, the lower
position means less to a high type buyer than to a low type buyer. For example, if a relatively
unknown company has a big marketing budget to attract search engine user traﬃc, it may
have a strong incentive to win a higher position, but its valuation for a lower position may
drop much more quickly than its competitors, because the reduced attention from those lower
positions does not serve the company’s strategic goal.
Let vk
i = β − ti(k − µ), where µ > K is the position for which each buyer has the same
valuation. In this example, µ is the horizontal value of the point where each utility function
crosses. Here ti is no longer the utility function’s intersection on the y axis. It not only aﬀects
the intersection (tiµ part), but also represents the slope of the utility function. This function
guarantees that the higher type buyer (larger ti) has a higher valuation for each position than
a lower valued buyer. Thus vk
i − vk
j = (ti − tj)(µ − k), and S(k) = (µ − k) > 0.





















f(t)dt − N · Ui(p,x,a) (20)
Deﬁne the modiﬁed virtual value c(ti) the same way as in section 3.1. In this case, c(ti)
again is represented by ti −
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) . To maximize this expression, if the distribution function
satisﬁes the regularity condition, again the positions should be allocated to those buyers with
the largest virtual values, that is, the K buyers with highest tis, whose types also satisfy
β + c(ti)(µ − k) ≥ 0. Notice that the reserve price r(k) = solve{c(ti) · (µ − k) + β = 0} is
decreasing in k. However, diﬀerent from Myerson (81), the winning modiﬁed virtual values
can be negative because of the presence of a positive constant β in the objective function.
How to allocate the positions among the buyers? Similar to Sec. 3.1 (Eq.17), deﬁne
zk(t−i) = inf{si|β + c(si) · (µ − k) ≥ 0 and c(si) ≥ Ck(t−i), k = 1,2,...,K} (21)
and z0(t−i) equal to b, the upper bound of the buyers’ value distribution. Then
11Proposition 3 The optimal incentive compatible allocation rule when the modiﬁed virtual
value ti −
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) is non-decreasing is to allocate the higher positions to the buyers with higher












1 if zk(t−i) ≤ si ≤ zk−1(t−i) ∀k
0 otherwise
(22)
Please refer to Appendix A.3 for proof of this proposition.
Thus, in this case the allocation rule satisﬁes the three criteria that Menezes (98) [14]
mentioned: zero expected payoﬀ for the lowest value; the K highest valued bidders win; and
the higher the value, the higher the position allocated. According to this allocation rule, each
position has a reserve price and the reserve prices are decreasing in the ranking of the positions;
at the same time, the tis receiving these positions are also decreasing in the rank of positions.
That means, for a certain position k, if there is no ti that satisﬁes the reserve price condition,
then that particular position will not be allocated, but a position lower than that may still
be allocated. This unallocated position can occur on the top, in the middle, or the bottom of
the ranking. In practice there are some measures that the seller can take to make a speciﬁc
position unavailable. For example, if there are K top paid links in a search engine and the
k0th position is not sold, then the search engine can insert one of its own ads (an ad about
the search engine itself) into that slot or insert a fake web link there; if these K positions
represent the order in a queue where all the jobs are waiting for processing, and the k0th slot
is unallocated, then the seller can deliberately delay the processing for all the jobs after the
k0th. 3

























i , ∀k = 1,2,...,K − 1) is not considered here. Please see Sec 4.









j (t−i) as in Sec.3.1 (buyer z0






1(t−i). Thus the optimal payment for the ﬁrst object is x1
i = Z1
1(t−i).
Now consider the second object. The buyer i can win the second object only if his type
is between the ﬁrst highest and second highest buyers’ type other than his own. Thus we get
R ti
a S(2)p2
if(s)ds = S(2)(ti − z2(t−i|z2 ≤ ti ≤ z1)prob(z2 ≤ ti ≤ z1) = (v2
i − Z2
2(t−i|z2 ≤ ti ≤
z1)) · prob(z2 ≤ ti ≤ z1). Thus the optimal payment for the second object is:
x2
i = v2
i (1 − prob(z2 ≤ ti ≤ z1) + Z2























The optimal payment for the rest of the positions can be obtained in the same way.
In general,
Proposition 4 The optimal payment for the ﬁrst position is x1
i(t) = Z1
1(t−i) if p1
i(t) = 1 and
for the k0th position (k > 1) is:
xk
i (ti) = vk
i (1 − prob(zk ≤ ti ≤ zk−1)) + Zk

























i(k) = 1,k = 2,...K
Lemma 1 In the convergent case, in expectation, if a buyer wins a position, he will pay at
least as much as the next highest type bidder’s valuation for that position.
Please refer to Appendix A.3 for proof.
Thus it is obvious that the seller can extract much more surplus from the buyers than in
the parallel case, where every winner pays K + 10th highest buyer’s valuation for his winning
position. More importantly, this mechanism performs better than the simple second-price
sequential auction, where in the best scenario the buyers pay the next highest valuation for
13the winning position. Intuitively, when diﬀerent buyers’ valuations for lower positions fall at
diﬀerent rates, the seller has an incentive to optimally match the position to the buyers to
maximize his expected payoﬀ. To charge a higher price for a lower position can prevent a
higher type buyer from shading his bid to win a lower position. This increases the seller’s
expected payoﬀ, comparing to the sequential second-price auction.
To better understand this mechanism, let’s assume that buyers’ types follow a uniform




is decreasing in k. For example, if there are 3 positions available, and µ = 6, β = 1, then the
reserve price for positions 1, 2, 3 are 2
5, 3
8, 1
3, respectively. If there are 4 buyers with realized
types t1 = 0.8, t2 = 0.6, t3 = 0.4, t4 = 0.2, then the position 1, 2, 3 will be allocated to buyer 1,




On the other hand, if the realized types are: t1 = 0.8, t2 = 0.35, t3 = 0.32, t4 = 0.2. Then t1
is allocated to position 1, t2 is allocated to position 3, while position 2 is not allocated.
3.3 The Divergent Case
This describes the case that the higher type buyer’s valuation drops slower for a lower position
than a lower type buyer’s. For example, Amazon.com is a big player in the paid placement
market. It spends a big amount of marketing money in attracting customers in every search
engine, but it probably doesn’t care which positions it wins. While a small company’s valuation
for a lower position may drop much faster.
Let vk
i = β−ti(k−µ), where µ < 1. Then vk
i −vk
j = (ti − tj)(µ−k), and S(k) = (µ−k) < 0.
We can repeat the analysis of the last section, except that because S(k) < 0, some of the
incentive compatibility conditions ((9) and (10)) should be rewritten as (11) and (12):

































































































f(t)dt − N · Ui(p,x,bi) (24)
Again deﬁne c(ti) = ti+
Fi(ti)
fi(ti) as the modiﬁed virtual value. If the modiﬁed virtual value is
non-decreasing in ti, (for example, uniform distribution, exponential distribution satisfy this
condition), since S(k) is negative, this objective function will be maximized if the K lowest






S(k) is non-negative. Notice that the
”reserve price” r(k) = solve{c(ti)·(µ−k)+β = 0} is again decreasing in k, thus the lower the
position, the tighter the reserve price condition. Further more, according to this allocation rule,
the lower tis are allocated the lower positions with tighter reserve price conditions. Thus we
can allocate the positions from the bottom to the top. If for a certain position k we can not ﬁnd
any buyer’s type lower than the reserve price, then this mechanism just automatically shifts
all the allocated positions up for 1 rank. In other words, after the buyers’ type are realized, we
can identify the number of positions available ( ˜ K) by calculating how many buyer’s types are
lower than the modiﬁed virtual value. Then identify the ˜ K winners, and allocate the highest
position to the highest ti, and so on. Thus all the unavailable slots (if any) occurs neither in
the top, nor in the middle, but in the bottom.
More speciﬁcally, deﬁne
dk(t−i) = sup{si|β + c(si) · (µ − k) ≥ 0 and c(si) ≤ Ck(t−i), k = 1,2,...,K} (25)
15and d0(t−i) equal to a, the lower bound of the buyers’ value distribution. Then
Proposition 5 The optimal incentive compatible allocation mechanism in the diverging case
is to allocate the lower position to the buyers with lower modiﬁed virtual values, given that






1 if d ˜ K−k(t−i) ≤ si ≤ d ˜ K−k+1(t−i) ∀k
0 otherwise
(26)
where ˜ K is the number of total available slots.
Proof is in appendix A.4. One thing needs to be noted is, if ti+
Fi(ti)
fi(ti) is increasing, when β





S(K), which means if every buyers’
valuation for the last position is high enough, since the reserve price condition is the tightest
for the last position, each buyer’s type satisﬁes the reserve price condition for the rest of the
positions (in other words, the reserve price condition becomes ti ≤ b). Thus this mechanism is
automatically eﬃcient and maximize the total payoﬀ of the buyers and the seller.
The payment scheme can be worked out accordingly as in section 3.2. That is, the optimal
payment for the lowest position (K) is DK
1 (t−i); and the optimal payment for the position
1 ≤ k < K is:
xk
i (ti) = vk
i (1 − prob(dK−k ≤ ti ≤ dK−k+1) + Dk
k(ti|dK−k ≤ ti ≤ dK−k+1)

























Thus other than the buyer with the lowest modiﬁed virtual value (the buyer with the least
steep slope), all the other winners are paying higher than the next buyer’s valuation for that
winning position. It is obvious that this mechanism works better than an simple second-price
sequential auction, in which the lower positions are up for sale ﬁrst, where the best scenario is
to earn the next highest buyer’s valuation for a winning position.
On the other hand, if ti +
Fi(ti)
fi(ti) is decreasing in ti, then to allocate the lower posi-
tion to the buyers with lower modiﬁed virtual value actually means the higher the ti, the
16greater probability to win an item. This violates the incentive compatible constraint (8) that
Q(pi,xi,si) ≤ Q(pi,xi,ti),if si ≤ ti. In this case, randomization is one way to allocate the
position. This is incentive compatible, but so far we do not have any results for optimality.
Again, if we assume that buyers’ types follow uniform distribution between [0,1], then the
reserve price condition for position k is: ti ≤
β
2(k−µ), where the reserve price is decreasing
in k again, and the reserve price condition is tighter with the increase in the ranking. Thus
the unallocated position will only be in the bottom. But if β is large enough such that
β ≥ 2(K − µ), then every type satisﬁes the reserve price condition and this mechanism is
automatically eﬃcient.
For example, if there are 3 positions available, and µ = 0, β = 3, then the reserve price
for positions 1, 2, 3 are 1, 0.75, 0.6, respectively. If there are 4 buyers with realized types
t1 = 0.8, t2 = 0.6, t3 = 0.4, t4 = 0.2, then the position 1, 2, 3 will be allocated to buyer 2, 3,




which are 0.8694, 0.8668, 1, respectively, while their values for their winning positions are 1.2,
1.4, 2, respectively. On the other hand, if the realized types are: t1 = 0.9, t2 = 0.85, t3 = 0.8,
t4 = 0.2. Then t3 is allocated to position 1, and t4 is allocated to position 2, while position 3
is not allocated. As we showed, the unallocated positions are always be in the bottom.
3.4 Convergent then Divergent
This is the extreme case of the convergent case, where if a buyer has a higher valuation for a
top position, his valuation for a lower position may be lower than his competitors. This means
diﬀerent buyers utility functions are allowed to cross in the middle. Again in the example of
search engine advertisers, a small company’s willingness to pay for a top position may be higher
than an established big company like Amazon.com. But because a small company often has
a tight budget, its valuation for a bottom position may be much lower than Amazon. Write
the utility function as vk
i = β − ti(k − µ), where (k − µ) > 0 before a certain e k ∈ [1,K] and
after that e k, (k −µ) < 0 is the point where each utility function crosses. Analyzing the utility
17function in the same way, vk
i − vk
j = (ti − tj)(µ − k), and S(k) = (µ − k) > 0 when k ≤ e k and
S(k) < 0 when k > e k.
Again one of the incentive compatibility conditions (9) should be rechecked because the
sign of S(k) changes before and after k = e k.
More speciﬁcally, there exists a w ∈ (a,b) such that we can rewrite the expression of Eq.
(9) into
Ui(p,x,ti) = Ui(p,x,w) +
R ti
w Qi(p,si)dsi if ti ≥ w
and
Ui(p,x,ti) = Ui(p,x,w) −
R w













































































































































i ,si)dsif(ti)dti is negative.






































f(t)dt − N · Ui(p,x,w)
(29)
18Assume that both the virtual value ti −
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) and the modiﬁed virtual value ti +
Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
are non-decreasing (for example, the uniform distribution satisﬁes these two conditions). To
maximize this objective function, if we make Ui(p,x,w) equal to 0, notice that when ti ≥ w,
µ − k ≥ 0, thus it is optimal to allocate the highest be kc − k positions to the buyers with the
highest virtual values ti −
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) ; when ti < w, µ − k < 0, thus it is optimal to allocate the
lowest K − de ke positions to the buyers with the lowest modiﬁed virtual value of ti +
Fi(ti)
fi(ti).
More speciﬁcally, proposition 6 describes this allocation rule.
Proposition 6 If the distribution of ti satisﬁes the regularity conditions and ti +
Fi(ti)
fi(ti) is
non-decreasing, the optimal allocation mechanism is: for each k < µ, allocated the highest






(µ − k) ≥ 0, until k = bµc, otherwise leave that particular position unassigned;
for each k > µ, allocate the remaining lowest position to the buyers with the remaining lowest






(µ − k) ≥ 0; otherwise shift the allocation up for 1
rank.
Proof. Follow the cases when µ − k ≥ 0 and µ − k < 0, which follow the proof in section
3.2 and 3.3. 3
The above gives the optimal mechanism given a speciﬁc w ∈ (a,b). Let this value be V (w).
Now the problem is how to identify that optimal w? Our objective function now becomes:
max
w V (w) (30)
Obviously w∗ is a function of µ, n, and K. For example, the ideal w∗ should have the
property that there are at least dK − µe buyers whose types are below w, and at least bµc
buyers whose types are above w. And this indicates that, given K, the optimal w should be
non-increasing in µ. But to complete this mechanism, w should be preannounced. So there is
positive probability that the above condition can not be satisﬁed, thus this mechanism is not
eﬃcient in addition to the existence of reserve price for each position, because there is positive
probability that a certain buyer whose type satisﬁes the reserve price, will give the seller higher
19proﬁt if he wins, but can not win because its type falls on the a “wrong” side of w. Figure
2 shows one example of how the optimal w changes with µ, assuming that bidders’ types are
uniformly distributed between [0,1], and β is large enough so the reserve price condition is
always satisﬁed. (In this example n = 7, k = 4, and µ can be anywhere between 1 and 4.)














Figure 2: How the optimal w changes with µ
From Figure 2 we can see that when the reserve price condition is satisﬁed, w is decreasing
with µ. Intuitively, the larger the µ, the more types should be above w, thus the smaller the
w. But one thing needs to be noted is that once k and n are ﬁxed, the only determinant of w
is between which two positions µ is located, while the exact position of µ between those two
positions does not matter.
Also in the example of uniform distribution between [0,1], the reserve price condition for
position k < µ is ti ≥ 1
2−
β
2(µ−k); for position k ≥ µ is ti ≤
β
2(k−µ). Combining with the choice of




for a position after µ is ti < min{w,
β
2(k−µ)}. For example, let K = 3, µ = 1.5, β = 0.5, w = 0.5.
Then we have the actual reserve price for position 1 before ˜ k is max{0.5,0} = 0.5, and the actual
reserve price for position 2 and 3 (after ˜ k) are: min{0.5,1} = 0.5, and min{0.5,0.333} = 0.333.
If the realized types are: t1 = 0.8, t2 = 0.6, t3 = 0.4, t4 = 0.2, then the position 1, 2, 3
20will be allocated to buyer 1, 3, 4. On the other hand, if the realized types are: t1 = 0.45,
t2 = 0.4, t3 = 0.3, t4 = 0.2. Then the ﬁrst position is not allocated, while the second position
is allocated to buyer 3, and the third position is allocated to buyer 4.
4 Implementation
Here we present an example of the optimal allocation and payment mechanism under the four
diﬀerent cases in ﬁgure 3.
1 2 3 k
i v
(a) parallel








1 2 3 k
i v
µ
(d) convergent and divergent
Figure 3: Optimal allocation and payment schemes under the four diﬀerent cases. (where ◦
represents the allocation, and 4 represents the payment.)
21Notice that in the mechanisms we discussed above, we assumed that the seller can commit
to leave a position unﬁlled if no buyer’s type satisﬁes the reserve price condition. We’ve
discussed such examples in Sec 3.2. In reality this practice of leaving a position unﬁlled is
commonly observed . For example, in the airline industry, passengers in the coach class are
not allowed to sit in the ﬁrst class without paying extra, even when the ﬁrst class is not full.
It’s also observed in some competitions, sometimes the highest award given is the second prize,
while the ﬁrst prize remains un-assigned. This guarantees that those who can pay for ﬁrst
class don’t understate their values, or high competition standard. In our model, this makes
sure that buyers do not reduce their bids, hoping to win a more desirable position when there
is lack of competition.
On the other hand, if the seller cannot commit to leave a position unﬁlled, that is, the









i k = 2,...K (31)
We ﬁnd that this constraint is binding only in two cases: convergent, and the converging portion
of the “convergent then divergent” case, because only in these two cases will a higher ti be
assigned to a higher position, with a higher reserve price. However this constraint changes the
maximization problem. Now the reserve price should guarantee the summation of each term
in the
P
to be non-negative, instead of making sure each term in the
P
to be non-negative.
However we will not discuss this problem in detail in this paper.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show how the earlier work about optimal auctions ([15], [13]) can be extended
and applied to the allocation of non-identical objects where every buyer only has unit demand,
and their preferences for these objects are ranked in the same order. We ﬁnd that the optimal
way to sell these non-identical objects is quite diﬀerent when buyers preferences for diﬀerent
objects change in diﬀerent way. Thus to understand the buyers preference characteristics is
22vital in determining the optimal mechanism. We ﬁnd that our mechanism works better than
simple second-price sequential auction. More speciﬁcally, when buyers’ valuations for a lower
position drop at diﬀerent rates, the seller can extract more surplus from the buyers than when
they drop at the same rate. Compare to the single unit or multiple identical unit case, besides
the ineﬃciency created by the reserve price (under the assumption of symmetric buyers), this
optimal allocation mechanism can be ineﬃcient because of the choice of the “pivot” type in
the fourth case.
We use linear value function in this paper, and assume that there exists some position
for which all utility functions give the identical value. This assumption may seem special
but it only says that there exists a position (probably very far away) such that every buyer’s
valuation for that position is the same (like a position in the very bottom of the result page).
Many commonly used utility functions when dealing with heterogeneous consumers have this
property (for example, U(θ) = θq where q is the quality of a product). In future research,
we hope to study more general settings of bidders preferences than the one discussed in this
paper. The case when the auctioneer can not commit to leave a position open (the addition
of constraint (31) is another interesting extension.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Feasibility of an Allocation Mechanism




















(si + (ti − si)S(k))pk








T−i ((ti − si)S(k))pk
i (t−i,si)f−i(t−i)dt−i
= Ui(p,x,si) + (ti − si)Qi(p,si)
The incentive compatibility constraint implies that:
Ui(p,x,ti;ti) ≥ Ui(p,x,si;ti) + (ti − si)Qi(p,si) ∀si (32)
Use (32) twice we get:
(ti − si)Qi(p,si) ≤ Ui(p,x,ti) − Ui(p,x,si) ≤ (ti − si)Qi(p,ti) (33)
So
Qi(p,si) ≤ Qi(p,ti) (34)
when si ≤ ti
Let ti − si = δ, then ( 33) can also be written as:
δQi(p,si) ≤ Ui(p,x,si + δ) − Ui(p,x,si) ≤ δQi(p,si + δ) (35)
Since Qi(p,si) is increasing in si, thus this equation is integrable and can be written as:
R ti
a Qi(p,si)dsi = Ui(p,x,ti) − Ui(p,x,a), so




From the other direction (the “if” part), to show (32), assume si ≤ ti, then using (8) and
(9) we get:






= Ui(p,x,si) + (ti − si)Qi(p,si)
26If si > ti, then






= Ui(p,x,si) + (ti − si)Qi(p,si)
So when S(k) ≥ 0, (pi,xi) is an optimal mechanism if it satisﬁes (8), (9), (10), (3), (4),
and (5) and maximizes (2). 3
A.2 The Parallel Case
Proposition 2.
The optimality of this allocation rule is obvious because ( 16) will be maximized if we pick
the buyers with the K highest virtual values (c(ti)), given ti −
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti is non-negative.
To check for the incentive compatibility constraint that Qi(p,x,si) ≤ Qi(p,x,ti) when
si ≤ ti, notice that if c(ti) ≥ max{CK(t−i),αk}, j ∈ n, where CK(t−i) is the K0th highest
virtual value among all the other buyers, then he wins. Since S(k) = 1, this equation purely
means the conditional probability of winning 1 item given type ti is higher than type si (si ≤ ti).
Since the highest K buyers win, and c(ti) is increasing, we know that the probability that
c(si) ≥ Ck(t−i) is increasing in si. So whenever buyer i could win by submitting si, he could
also win by submitting ti where ti > si. So Q(p,x,ti) is indeed increasing in ti. 3
A.3 The Convergent Case
Proposition 3. Since S(k) = µ−k is positive, the objective function will be maximized if the
seller allocates the higher position (larger µ−k) to the buyers of higher type (larger ti−
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) .
To see this, let yj be the j
0
th highest value of ti−
1−Fi(ti)
fi(ti) , comparing yj(µ−k)+yj+1(µ−k−1)
and yj+1(µ − k) + yj(µ − k − 1). Note that the diﬀerence between these two expression is
that:yj −yj+1 > 0. This can be generalized to the case where there are more than 2 values. 3
Lemma 1. We only need to show for a speciﬁc position k, vk
i − Zk
k(ti) is no less than
27(vk
i − Zk






k(ti|zk ≤ ti ≤ zk−1)) · prob(zk ≤ ti ≤ zk−1)
+(vk
i − Zk
k(ti|zk ≤ ti & zk−1 ≤ ti)) · prob(zk ≤ ti & zk−1 ≤ ti)
and both of the terms to the right of “=” are non-negative. 3
A.4 The Divergent Case
Proposition 5. First we want to show that to allocate a lower position to a lower modiﬁed
virtual value (lower type) is optimal. Let 0 < A1 < A2 < A3 and 0 < B1 < B2 < B3. The
objective is to minimize
P
i,j AiBj. And A1B3+A2B2+A3B1 < A1B2+A2B3+A3B1 because
it is equivalent to A1(B3−B2)+A2(B2−B3) < 0; A1B3+A2B2+A3B1 < A1B1+A2B2+A3B3
because it is equivalent to A1(B3 −B1)+A3(B1 −B3) = (A1 −A1)(B3 −B1) < 0. This result
can be generalized to the case where i ≥ 3.
To check whether this allocation rule is incentive compatible, revisit the constraint (8) that






0. Thus the higher ti, the less likely that the buyer is going to win, and the less negative S(k),
thus constraint (8) is indeed satisﬁed. 3
28